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NOTE
THE BEST EQUITABLE DEFENSE IS
A GOOD OFFENSE
CERCLA-Caveat emptor is not a defense to liability but may
be considered when apportioning damages among potentially
responsible parties. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) established a statutory scheme to encourage prompt,
efficient, and voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste disposal sites by those
responsible for the waste. 2 CERCLA lists four categories of potentially3
responsible parties (PRPs) who may be liable for remediation of a site.
Included in this list is the owner of the land and the depositor of the
waste. 4 Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp. (Celotex)5
decided whether one who deposits the hazardous waste and then sells the
land can avoid liability to the buyer by asserting the defense of caveat
emptor.6
In 1963, Philip Carey Manufacturing Company (Carey) sold a 160acre tract of land in Plymouth Township, Pennsylvania, to Smith Land
I. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L,
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at, 26 U.S.C. §§4611-4682 (1982 & Supp. 1986),
42 U.S.C. §§ 6911(a), 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1986)) (CERCLA).
2. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290
n. 6 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1986), sets forth the scope of liability under CERCLA:
Notwithstanding any other provisions or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set
forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment,
or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance shall be liable...
4. 42 U.S.C. §§9607(a)(1), (2) (1982).
5. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Docket Number 88-703, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L.Ed.2d
969 (1989).
6. A second question decided was whether Celotex, a successor corporation who did not deposit
the waste, would be liable for the hazardous waste deposited by its predecessor, Philip Carey
Manufacturing.
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& Improvement Corporation (Smith). On the land was a large pile of
manufacturing waste containing asbestos that Carey had deposited. In
1984, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) informed Smith that
it would have to remove the asbestos hazard or reimburse EPA for the
work pursuant to CERCLA. Smith corrected the problem, allegedly incurring costs of $218,945.
Smith's complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania originally contained several common law counts
under state law7 and the federal cause of action under CERCLA. 8 Smith
sought reimbursement from Celotex on the theory that Carey generated
the waste and Celotex was liable as the corporate successor to Carey.
Celotex moved successfully to dismiss all claims on the defense of caveat
emptor. The court stated that CERCLA creates a private cause of action,9
but held that the defense of caveat emptor precluded Smith from any
contribution by Celotex. The court found that in the absence of fraud or
misrepresentation, a sophisticated buyer cannot recover from the seller
when cleanup costs accrue.", The court noted that Smith bought the land
in an open transaction, inspected the land at least five times, knew of its
past use, had the opportunity to perform test borings of the property, and
admitted that the waste was a negative factor in the decision to purchase
the land." The district court concluded that the price Smith paid for the
land reflected the possibility of environmental risks and therefore completely precluded Smith from any recovery.' 2
The only claim on appeal to the Third Circuit was the federal claim
under CERCLA. The circuit court reversed and remanded. The court held
that caveat emptor may not be asserted as a defense to liability under
CERCLA but may be used to equitably apportion cleanup costs between
PRPs in a contribution suit under CERCLA.' 3 The court remanded the
case to determine whether the price paid for the land reflected the presence
of hazardous waste. 4 If answered in the affirmative, the lower court may
use equity to mitigate damages.
7. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Rapid-American Corp., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20769 (Sept. 21, 1987) (common law counts of nuisance, public nuisance, unjust enrichment,
and indemnity).
8. Id. at 20770.
9. Id. at 20770 n. 1.
10. Id. at 20771.

I1 Id. at 20770.
12. Id.
13. Smith v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988).
14. id. at 90. The court further held that successor liability should be imposed on a corporation
that has either merged or consolidated with a corporation that is a potentially responsible party
(PRP). Id.at 92. The holding of the court on corporate successor liability was well within the bounds
of traditional liability of consolidation and merger. See W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 7121, at 185 (rev. penn. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL ISSUES
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA to deal with the growing problem
of contamination of natural resources due to hazardous waste sites. CERCLA was drafted and passed as a compromise in a lame duck session of
Congress and failed to address many issues specifically. Some of the
issues have been resolved judicially and others through the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). This note will
examine judicial interpretations of liability under CERCLA, examine how
SARA affected actions brought under CERCLA, and examine judicially
recognized equitable defenses to CERCLA liability.
The CERCLA process begins when a release 6 occurs. A site that is
identified as needing cleanup is placed on the National Priorities List. 7
EPA then has two options. First, EPA can notify a PRP that the site needs
to be cleaned up and force the party under CERCLA Section 9606 to
take action.'" Second, EPA can cleanup the site using Superfund monies 9
and then pursue reimbursement.2' When EPA sues PRPs for Superfund
reimbursement, EPA may choose any single or combination of PRP(s).
A named PRP may settle with EPA for its own share or decide to fight
liability through litigation. A PRP that has incurred costs consistent with
the national
contingency plan2' may then seek contribution from other
22
PRPs.

Early in CERCLA's history, the courts and commentators struggled
with the standard of liability imposed by CERCLA. Most courts determined that the liability imposed on a PRP is strict. 2' Strict liability means
that EPA need not show causation or intent in the prima facie case for
CERCLA liability. CERCLA's legislative history24 and CERCLA's reference to and interrelationship with the Federal Water Pollution Control
15. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1614 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 (Supp. 1986)) (SARA).
16. 42 U.S.C. §9601(22) (Supp. 1986).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B) (Supp. 1986). As part of the national contingency plan, the President
shall list priorities among the known releases throughout the United States and shall revise the list
no less often than annually.
18. 42 U.S.C. §9606 (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. §9611 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982).
21. 42 U.S.C. §9605 (1982 & Supp. 1986) creates a plan to be known as the national hazardous
substance response plan which shall establish procedures and standards for responding to releases
of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.
22. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(B) (1982).
23. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United
States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20497 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United
States v.Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); City of Philadelphia v.Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
24. See generally 126 Cong.Rec. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph, one of CERCLA's
chief sponsors).
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Act25 support the contention that CERCLA's standard of liability
is strict.
26
It is now well established that CERCLA liability is strict.
The next question for the courts was whether the liability was joint
and several. Courts struggled with the question of legislative
intent, and
27
decided most cases in favor of joint and several liability.
A PRP that has been found jointly and severally liable may then want
to pursue contribution claims against other PRPs. While SARA expressly
provides for contribution, it does not articulate any rules to govern contribution. SARA Section 9613 provides that "[any person may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under Section 9607(a) of this title .... Such claims ...shall be governed

by Federal law. "28

Prior to SARA, federal courts had searched for a way to apportion
response costs among PRPs. Because CERCLA was silent on the issue
of contribution, the issue was whether to apply state or federal common
law to determine the scope of liability. In examining a federal statute
where there is a lack of an express statutory provision selecting state or
federal law, the Supreme Court in United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc.
articulated a three part test to determine if federal common law is appropriate.' First, does the issue require a nationally uniform body of
law?"° Second, does the application of state law frustrate specific objectives of federal programs?3 Third, does the application of a federal rule
disrupt commercial relations predicated on state law?3 2 A federal court
applying this test held that contribution under CERCLA does require a
federal common law. 3 In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,' Judge
Rubin held that a federal common law was important because of the need
for uniform application of federal statutes, the national magnitude of
25. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9601(32) (Supp. 1986), defines liability to be construed under the
standard of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1982). Prior to the
enactment of CERCLA, a number of courts interpreted section 1321 as imposing strict liability. See
Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir. 1978).
26. See supra note 23.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20497 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20385 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5. 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling

& Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20272, 20275 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F
Materials, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. I11.
1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
28. 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1) (Supp. 1986).
29. 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. id.
33. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, LId., 804 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., United
States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. 11. 1984).
34. 572 F Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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waste disposal problems, and the need for the United States to be quickly
reimbursed for the cleanup costs it incurs."
Views differ as to how contribution under federal common law should
be determined. The Restatement of Torts approach to liability is that when
two or more persons cause a single harm for which there is a reasonable
basis for contribution, each is subject to liability only for the portion of
the total harm he caused. 36 Another approach, found in SARA Section
9613(f), gives courts little guidance in resolving contribution claims. It
merely states that "the court may allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court deems are appropriate." 3"
Courts that follow the Restatement of Torts have found that the party
seeking apportionment has the burden of proving divisible harm.3' Where
the harm is indivisible, each is subject to liability for the entirety. All
PRPs would be liable for the costs of response regardless of any other
factors.3 9 If the harm is divisible, a number of factors weigh in the
apportionment, such as the volume and toxicity of the waste for which
each party is responsible.' In practice though, these factors do not measure the total harm contributed by each, making apportionment for the
combined hazardous waste extremely difficult. 4' A typical waste disposal
site could contain waste from several contributors.4" After waste from
many sources has comingled, the synergistic effects may make apportionment impossible.43 In one case where the apportionment was possible,
the costs of identifying through analytical means the types of waste would
be approximately five times more costly than the cost of cleanup." The
impossibility of apportionment using the Restatement "reasonable basis"
approach is often given as a reason why some courts do not apportion
response costs.45
35. Id. at 808-09.
36. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§443(A), 881 (1976).
37. 42 U.S.C. §9613(f)(1) (Supp. 1986).
38. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443(B) (1976); see United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572
F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20272, 20275-76 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, t985). One area, in particular, where the harsh results of CERCLA can be seen is in lender
liability. Banks that foreclose on lands containing hazardous waste become owners under CERCLA.
In Mirabile the court held that CERCLA liability will be imposed on lenders involved in the actual
operation of the facility that participate in operational, production, or waste disposal activities. 15
Envtl. L. Rep. at 20995.
40. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20272, 20275 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984).
45. See, e.g., id.; Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811. Judge Rubin states that the volume of waste
is not an accurate predictor of the risk associated with the waste because the toxicity or migratory
potential of a particular hazardous substance generally varies independently with the volume of the
waste. Id.
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In UnitedStates v. A & F Materials,I the federal district court examined
legislative intent and adopted the Gore Amendment as a moderate approach to strict joint and several liability. The Gore Amendment was
passed by the House but rejected by the Senate before CERCLA's passage
in 1980 because it gave a court the power to impose joint and several
liability where a defendant could not prove his contribution to an injury.47
The Gore Amendment takes into consideration factors such as the ability
to apportion the hazardous waste, volume, toxicity, degree of involvement, degree of care, and degree of cooperation with officials.4 However,
the Gore Amendment has not been accepted as a realistic or workable
guide to apportionment. The nature of hazardous waste and hazardous
waste dumps makes it very difficult, and in many ways impossible, to
assign response costs among PRPs.49
To keep potential response costs at a minimum, a PRP has strong
reasons to join the cleanup process early. First, SARA gives a PRP more
incentive to admit liability early in the cleanup process in order to minimize eventual cleanup costs. Through the inclusion of higher cleanup
standards, 5" the application of more detailed federal standards, 5 and the
incorporation of more stringent state standards,52 the cleanup costs will
increase. There is evidence that the costs are even higher when EPA
chooses the remedial action, does the work, and then sues the PRP for
reimbursement,5 3 than when a PRP takes responsibility for the cleanup
remedy. Thus, a PRP should join the cleanup process early in an effort
to contain the costs of the final remedial decision.
More incentives for PRPs to join the cleanup process are found in
46. United States v. A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (S.D. I11. 1984).
47. Id. at 1256.
48. 126 Cong. Rec. 9,461 (1980). The criteria of the Gore Amendment are:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release,
or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste concerned,
taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with federal, state, or local officials to prevent
any harm to the public health or environment.
49. As one court concluded, "to require a plaintiff under CERCLA to 'fingerprint' wastes is to
eviscerate the statute." United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
50. SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a), (b) (Supp. 1986) require the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to adhere to stringent requirements favoring permanent on-site treatment as the remedy for
all sites.
51. 42 U.S.C. §9621(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1986).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§9621(e), (f) (Supp. 1986).
53. See, e.g., Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985
Duke L. J. 261, 301-02 (EPA assessment and cleanup costs average 30% to 40% more than equivalent
private cleanups).
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SARA which provides procedures that facilitate voluntary settlements,54
encourage private conduct of both remedial investigation/feasibility study
work" and remedial action. Another procedure allows a PRP to request
from EPA a Nonbinding Preliminary Allocation of Responsibility (NPAR).'
The NPAR is not admissible in court and is not subject to judicial review.57
It is voluntary and can be requested by any PRP. The NPAR gives the
parties an indication of what their respective responsibilities could be and
may guide settlement cost allocation. The reality of transaction costs58 in
CERCLA litigation make it desirable for EPA to settle the case out-ofcourt. The costs of litigation for PRPs are also an incentive to settle.
Private parties seeking to avoid liability to EPA, or contribution or
indemnification to other PRPs, have few defenses available. CERCLA
lists four in Section 9607(b).5 9 However, throughout the text of CERCLA
are found several other limited defenses that have given support to arguments claiming that the defenses listed in Section 9607(b) are not
exclusive.' For example, Section 9607(j) bars government recovery for
response costs resulting from a federally permitted release,' and Section
54. 42 U.S.C. §9622 (Supp. 1986).
55. 42 U.S.C. §9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1986), provides that private parties may conduct remedial
investigation/feasibility studies provided that EPA approves the work and the private parties agree
to reimburse EPA for the cost of retaining an EPA expert to oversee the study.
56. 42 U.S.C. §9622(e)(3) (Supp. 1986).
57. 42 U.S.C. §9622(a) (Supp. 1986).
58. EPA estimates that 30% of Superfund monies are expended on transaction costs. These costs
go to legal and administrative expenses. S. Rep. No. It, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1985) (EPA's
answers to Sen. Simpson). In United States v. Conservation Chemical Corp., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D.
Mo. 1984), there was speculation as to whether litigation costs would be greater than the cleanup
costs. See also, S. Rep. No. 11, supra.
59. 42 U.S.C. §9607(b) (1982), provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable
who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of
a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by
(1)an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or
than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a)
he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts
or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
60. In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 n. 9 (D. Ariz. 1984), the
court noted that res judicata, payment, and accord and satisfaction are not listed as defenses but
would be recognized as such. The listed defenses are those in § 9607 and yet other textual defenses,
such as the statute of limitations, are recognized. Mardan went one step further to list other available
defenses that are not stated in CERCLA.
61. 42 U.S.C. §96070) (Supp. 1986).
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9612(d) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on some claims.62
Although SARA expanded the available statutory defenses, the express
defenses remain few and narrow. An "innocent landowner" may have a
defense63 if the buyer can establish that he acquired property without
knowledge of contamination and had no reason to know of it. Another
provision added by SARA provides for de minimis settlements between
EPA and PRPs who have contributed to pollution in amounts small enough
to justify absolving them of all costs. 4 In addition, SARA extended the
CERCLA statute of limitations defense.6' Nevertheless all the statutory
defenses under both CERCLA and SARA are very limited; PRPs therefore
try to urge courts to accept equitable defenses.
In Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,' a federal district court
accepted an equitable defense in a CERCLA claim, applying the unclean
hands doctrine. The court said that since Mardan contributed to a contaminated pool that C.G.C. started, Mardan was completely barred from
recovering response costs from C.G.C. even though C.G.C. deposited a
large majority of the waste. A purchase agreement which stated that
Mardan released C.G.C. from all further liability helped bar Mardan's
recovery. The release clause in the purchase agreement was a general
release and did not specifically list hazardous waste. Nevertheless, the
court held that since there were protracted negotiations, Mardan knew of
the waste and impliedly released C.G.C. from liability in the general
release clause.67 On appeal, the circuit court found that Mardan released
C.G.C. from liability and declined to reach the unclean hands issue.s
62. 42 U.S.C. §9612(d) (Supp. 1986).
63. See, e.g., SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1986), which introduces a definition of contractual relationship that relieves from liability landowners who acquired property unaware of the
presence of hazardous material on the property. However, section 9601(35)(B) states that the defendant must establish that he undertook appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses
of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in a effort to minimize
liability. Section 9601(35)(B) thus imposes an affirmative duty on the buyer to inspect the property
and transaction in order to assert the defense. Therefore, by imposing diligence on the buyer the
possibility of an innocent landowner is eliminated.
64. 42 U.S.C. §9622(g) (Supp. 1986).
65. 42 U.S.C. §9613(g) (Supp. 1986) adds a 6 year statute of limitations for recovery actions
against the Fund and 3 years for natural resource claims.
66. 600 F Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd. in part, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (The court
affirmed on the basis of an express agreement to release liability and did not consider the "unclean
hands" issue.).
67. Agreements to hold harmless are not allowed against EPA but are allowed as a defense
between parties. 42 U.S.C. §9607(e) (1982). Agreements to hold harmless are recognized by
CERCLA but are governed by state law. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454,
1460 (9th Cir. 1986). In Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Duracell Int'l, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549, 594 (M.D.
Tenn. 1987), a purchase agreement which contained a clause holding Emhart (the buyer) harmless
was claimed as a defense by Emhart. Emhart continued to use toxic substances after acquiring the
land. The court held that Duracell would be entitled to prove Emhart's contribution to the contamination in avoidance of further liability. 665 F. Supp. at 571.
68. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461.
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The Third Circuit in PhiladephiaElectric Company v. Hercules, Inc.9
reviewed a state clean streams statute and allowed the defense of caveat
emptor. The buyer, aware that the contamination decreased the value of
the land, paid a price which reflected the decreased value. Under these
circumstances, the court found it inequitable to make the seller first take
a reduction in the price of the land because of the known hazard and then
pay for cleanup later.7" In effect, the seller would pay twice for the waste.
The Hercules court specifically stated that its holding was not to be read
as allowing a seller to escape liability by selling contaminated land, but
was only applying the doctrine of caveat emptor to the facts of the case.
The equitable factors in Hercules led to a complete bar to recovery by
the buyer.
ANALYSIS
In Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,7 the Third
Circuit refused to allow caveat emptor to operate as a complete bar to
recovery, but on remand directed the district court to consider whether
caveat emptor could mitigate liability. In Celotex, the court admitted that
either Smith or Celotex could have been liable to EPA under CERCLA.72
Celotex was a private contribution suit and neither party had been sued
by EPA yet. However, Smith as the present owner of the contaminated
land, had already incurred response costs in the cleanup. Smith was not
able to use the Section 9601(35)(A) innocent landowner provision against
Celotex because Smith examined the land before buying it and knew of
the waste. 73 When Smith attempted to get Celotex to contribute to the
cleanup, Celotex as a last resort asserted the defense of caveat emptor.
Celotex was not able to use the contractual agreement defense74 because
it had not included in the purchase agreement a release clause which
specifically exempted it from further liability. Celotex did not fall under
any other defenses and therefore looked to the equitable defense to a
contribution suit contained in Section 9613. 75 The Third Circuit, when
examining Celotex's defense, did not have a full record before it to rule
on the equitable defense of caveat emptor. Specifically the court did not
know whether the price paid for the land reflected the presence of hazardous waste. If Celotex reduced the price of the land and Smith paid a
69. 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
70. Id. at 314-15.
71. 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
72. Id. at 89.
73. 42 U.S.C. §9601(35) (Supp. 1986).
74. See supra note 67 and 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1982).
75. See 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65991 (1988) (citing brief for Celotex which uses 42
U.S.C. §%13(f)(1) (Supp. 1986) as a defense to liability).
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reduced price because of the waste, it would be inequitable to make
Celotex pay twice for the waste. On remand the Third Circuit directed
the federal district court to allow caveat emptor to mitigate damages if
the presence of waste had already been calculated into the price paid for
the land. The court, in dicta, stated that allowing caveat emptor as a
complete defense to liability would frustrate the purpose of CERCLA. 76
Purposes of CERCLA and SARA include prompt and voluntary cleanup
of hazardous waste sites by those who contributed to the waste. The
cleanup can be done by PRPs as soon as it is discovered that it needs to
be done. Generally, EPA cleanups are more costly and take a longer
time." Private cleanups can serve the dual goals of prompt cleanup and
efficient use of cleanup dollars, thereby leaving more funds for EPA to
do its job.
The incentive is already in place for a PRP to join early in the cleanup.
When a PRP is named by the EPA under CERCLA it is difficult to avoid
liability. Judicial interpretation of CERCLA that initial liability will be
strict, joint and several forces a PRP to pay the shares of absent or
insolvent parties. The initially liable PRP who sues another PRP for
contribution can recover only the share attributed to the other PRP brought
into the suit, but not the costs attributed to absent or unknown parties.
In addition, the burden of proving apportionment is on the named PRP
seeking contribution. Thus, the PRPs that EPA names have a greater
probability of paying a percentage of the response costs greater than their
contribution to the waste.
A named PRP who attempts to avoid liability may only increase the
eventual cost. Because transaction costs are expensive," and cleanup
decisions take a long period of time,79 costs may be reduced if a PRP
steps in early to guide EPA action. It is in the interest of both EPA and
a PRP for a PRP to settle early. A PRP who is clearly liable and settles
can escape the inequitable results of joint and several liability by avoiding
paying absent shares, and EPA does not have the substantial transaction
costs for which the PRP is also potentially responsible.8"
A PRP in the situation where liability is not so clear must seriously
weigh the risks of litigation. If the PRP is not named by EPA but by
another PRP in a contribution suit, they have a wider range of defenses
available to them under SARA Section 9613(f) which provides for equity
76. 851 F2d at 89-90.
77. See supra notes 53, 58, and infra note 79.
78. See supra notes 53 and 58.
79. Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod Ill, & Conners, An Annotated LegislativeHistory offhe Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10360,
10366 (1986) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (EPA's total time estimate for the cleanup process is over sixand-a-half years.).
80. 42 U.S.C. §9611 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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in contribution suits." However, a PRP must clearly show the court that
equity entitles it to a lesser or non-existent share of liability. Because
courts do not want to encourage PRPs to wait and see who else is liable,
it will be difficult for PRPs to deny liability. Celotex holds that equitable
factors can affect liability between PRPs. This holding is in keeping with
both congressional intent and the clear statutory language of Section 9613.
By maintaining the difficulty in escaping initial liability to EPA while
easing the way for equitable contribution between PRPs, the courts help
EPA obtain reimbursement while PRPs have a better opportunity to apportion cleanup costs.
CONCLUSION
The decision of Celotex may make equitable defenses in suits for
contribution more common. Equitable defenses will further CERCLA and
SARA's goals of funding hazardous waste cleanup by the waste-producing
industry itself. Lessening the harshness of applying strict, joint and several
liability is needed so that minor contributors are not forced to bear a
disproportionate burden of response costs. Intransigent PRPs need to
know that harsh results will occur if they choose to litigate with EPA,
rather than voluntarily settle. The goals of prompt and voluntary cleanup,
however, are furthered if a PRP is able to get reimbursement from other
PRPs for private cleanup. Nevertheless, PRPs should not think that they
will be able to escape liability by using equitable arguments. By "sitting
back" and waiting to see if it will be held liable, it is risking higher
eventual cleanup costs.
YVETTE GONZALES

81. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

